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You Have Backups. Can You Actually Recover from Ransomware?

A recovery drill that checks isolation, data integrity and business restart, not just backup completion.

You Have Backups. Can You Actually Recover from Ransomware?

A successful backup job is only the beginning

A green dashboard confirms that a job ran; it does not prove that a business service can return safely. CISA recommends offline, encrypted backups of critical data and regular tests of their availability and integrity. Start by naming the systems whose loss would stop operations. For each one, document the recovery point, acceptable downtime, application dependencies, responsible people and the location of a protected copy.

Run a clean-room restoration drill

Choose a representative dataset and restore it into an isolated environment. Confirm that the backup is readable, that credentials and keys are available to authorized responders, and that the recovered data matches expected records. Rebuild the supporting application, identity and network components in the required order. Measure the elapsed time from declaring the incident to a usable service, not merely the time needed to copy files.

Record evidence and close the gaps

NIST SP 1800-11 stresses that recovery from destructive events requires confidence in the accuracy of restored data. Keep a drill log with the backup version, integrity checks, failures, decisions and business sign-off. Test scenarios in which the normal administrator account or the primary site is unavailable. Treat missed targets as engineering work: remove single points of failure, update runbooks and repeat the drill. An offline copy and an immutable copy can be complementary controls, but neither replaces a demonstrated restoration.